civil forfeiture proceeds which are used to finance the government's law enforcement efforts. 5 In a discussion about seized proceeds, former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh stated: "It's satisfying to think that it's now possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting operation." '6 While this concept may appeal to our sense ofjustice, it may compromise constitutional principles.
Since forfeiture proceedings are civil actions, many of the constitutional protections of criminal proceedings do not apply. For example, claimants do not have the full Fifth Amendment "right to silence." If a claimant chooses to "take the Fifth" in civil proceedings, a court may draw an adverse inference from her silence. 7 This Comment will evaluate the constitutional implications of drawing such negative inferences from a claimant's decision to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege in forfeiture actions under the Drug Abuse and Prevention Act. 8 First, this Comment will explore the historical background of forfeiture and discuss the Fifth Amendment and any implications that the amendment's historical development might have on its use in forfeiture proceedings. Then, this Comment will analyze the Supreme Court's holdings with regard to the use of the Fifth Amendment in forfeiture actions and will analyze its more recent holdings that arguably broaden the constitutional protections for claimants in forfeiture proceedings. A discussion of the constitutional implications of drawing a negative inference from a claimant's silence will conclude this Comment.
II. A CML CLAIMANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Civil claimants do not always receive the same constitutional 745 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Porsche forfeited when its occupant bought a small quantity of heroin).
5 21 U.S.C. § 881 (e) (1988) . See also Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 251 nn.37-38 (showing that the Department of Justice has committed millions of dollars of forfeited funds to the federal prison system).
6 Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 251 nn.37-38 (citing Seized Drug Funds to Pay for Prisons, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, at A10). Thornburgh announced that $229 million from forfeited funds would be used to build prison cells. Id. 7 See, e.g., United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625 (1lth Cir. 1986) (finding that a negative inference may be taken from a claimant's silence in a civil forfeiture proceeding as long as the court's final judgment is not based solely on that inference). But see United States v. Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that negative inferences may be impermissible in the forfeiture context "given the severity of the deprivation at risk").
8 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)-(k) (1988 tutional protection, such as the Fifth Amendment right to due process, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, or the Eighth Amendment right against excessive punishment. 15 Since the owner's guilt or innocence is not at issue, sometimes a guiltless owner will lose her property. 16 The government has attempted to address this problem by including "innocent owner" provisions in some forfeiture statutes. 1 7 These provisions require the owner to prove that she did not consent nor did she know that her property was going to be used in association with any drug transactions. 1 8 This burden is often hard to meet; consequently, it does not protect many owners. For example, the innocent owner provision has not applied to parents who let their child borrow their car, knowing that their child had used drugs in the past or had associated with people who use drugs.' 9 Although the Supreme Court recently reexamined civil forfeiture laws and ensured claimants their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and the protection of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, 20 16 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (upholding the forfeiture of an automobile co-owned by a husband and wife without any compensation to the innocent wife when the automobile was forfeited to the state upon the husband's conviction of gross indecency with a prostitute inside the automobile); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 690 (upholding the forfeiture of a yacht although it was the lessees of the yacht that brought marijuana aboard her).
17 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988) . Recently, the Supreme Court noted that the inclusion of an innocent owner defense in this statute indicates that the purpose of the statute is to punish. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810; but see Bennis, 1996 WL 88269, *6-7 (In an opinion that was not joined by a majority of the court Justice Rehnquist noted that a state remedial civil forfeiture statute was both punitive, deterrent, and remedial.). Commentators have argued that the "innocent owner" provisions do not sufficiently ameliorate the harshness of forfeiture laws. See, e.g., Schecter, supra note 3, at 1180.
18 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988 In contrast, Blackstone believed that the deodand had deeper significance than a family's need for revenge. He argued that ultimately the only valid foundation for forfeiture lies in the substance of the contract that individuals make when forming a community. 35 If an individual transgresses the law of a society, she breaks the social contract.
3 6 Consequently, she forfeits to the state any rights or privileges derived from that social contract. 
1987) (tracing the development of the deodand).
33 HOLMES, supra note 28, at 31. Common law mandated forfeiture for felonies and treason. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 299. Those that breached the king's peace through criminal acts lost the privilege of owning property. Id. Additionally, objects used in violation of English customs and revenue laws were statutorily forfeited. Id. at 261-62. Usually, these forfeitures were enforced in the Court of Exchequer in the same in rem procedures used to seize the property of felons. Id. A problem with this theory is that objects often caused the death-objects that may have even belonged to the victim. See Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 182.
34 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 261-62. However, Blackstone notes that forfeiture of chattels was also grounded, in part, on the negligence of the owner. Id. at 290-91. If an individual were killed by a moving object, the owner probably could have avoided the accident; failure to avoid the accident constituted negligence. Id. From this perspective, loss of the object was essentially a punishment. Id. Support for Blackstone's argument may be found in the elimination of the deodand in England during the same year (1846) as the passage of the first statute, "Act For Compensating Families of Persons Killed By Accidents" (also known as "Lord Cambell's Act"), creating a private cause of action for wrongful death. See Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 170-73 & nn.1-16. 35 Blackstone states:
The true reason and only substantial ground for any forfeiture of crimes consist in this; that all property is derived from society, being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities. If therefore a member of any national community violates the fundamental contract of his association, by transgressing the municipal law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that contract; and the state may veryjustly resume that portion of property, or any part of it, which the laws have before assigned him. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 289.
36
Id.
37
Id. Some commentators disagree with Blackstone, arguing that the deodand shifted the focus from an owner, and the justification for punishing her, to the object. See Piety, 
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Recent commentators, agreeing in part with Blackstone, contend that early English forfeitures were imposed on individuals for the benefit of the community; an owner's guilt or innocence was moot s because the good of the community transcended the needs of the individual. 3 9 Therefore, forfeiture was not about liability, but evolved as a means to compensate the King and society for the loss of one of its components. 40 Whatever one's views of its derivations, deodands were a valuable source of revenue for the Crown and continued in England until the mid-nineteenth century when they were abolished by statute. Modern forfeiture acts originated during England's seventeenth century maritime expansion. 4 2 Forfeiture proceedings arose in admiralty as a response to the needs of the merchant class. 4 3 Through forfeiture, the government could proceed in an in rem action against the property. 44 Although deodands never became part of the common law in (1977) . 40 Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 183 (arguing that the real rationale for the deodand institution lay in the assumption by the state-in England, i.e., the Crown-"of the role of the vicar of transcendent concerns and values, superseding the Church in most of its authority in these domains"); see also Piety, supra note 31, at 931-32. 41 In 1846 Parliament abolished the law of deodands when it passed An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.). However, at the same time, Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act, which created a private cause of action for wrongful death. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 42 Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154. Admiralty in rem actions came from the mid-seventeenth century English Navigation Acts, which were enacted to compensate for the inability of the admiralty courts to assert in personamjurisdiction. Piety, supra note 31, at 935-36. Merchants liked the in rem proceeding because it gave them a significantly greater chance at compensation than would a similar suit at common law. Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154. Governments liked it because it allowed the forfeiture of ships as a penalty when owners attempted to avoid paying customs duties. 49 Through these procedures, the government can proceed against property in rem. 50 Since the government proceeds against the "guilty" property and not against an individual, in rem actions offer the government the benefit of conducting the proceedings in a civil arena where there is a lower burden of proof and fewer constitutional protections. The Supreme Court regularly has recited the "guilty property" fiction as support for its holdings regarding the constitutionality of forfeiture procedures. 5 1 The Court has stated that it is the thing that has committed the offense. 52 Since the property is the offender, the 
HOISTED BY THEJR OWN PETARD
property is the defendant 5 3 Through the guilty property fiction, the government has been able to pursue two different proceedings, criminal and civil; a proceeding in rem is fully independent of a proceeding in personam.
4
With the property as the defendant, the government arguably can circumvent rights granted to individuals charged with crimes. 55 In this way, civil forfeiture proceedings are similar to seventeenth century English procedures; they "purge" the community of guilty "objects" for the general good. Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, codified in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)-(k), the United States government may seize all monies used in drug transactions, properties used to contain, transport, or facilitate the transportation of drugs, and real property which facilitates drug transactions. 57 In addition, all proceeds from such transactions are subject to forfeiture. 58 The government interprets the term "proceeds" broadly to include all property that may have a connection with drug transactions. 56 A Senate Report states that the government needs "new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts . (1992) . Mann distinguishes the typical criminal paradigm from the typical civil paradigm by noting that the government imposes sanctions for criminal acts because criminal acts are "public wrongs" while civil sanctions apply "to conduct that causes actual damage to an individual interest...." Id. Thus, the criminal law has been characterized as "an instrument for protecting the public." Id. at 1807. Because punitive civil sanctions do not fit into either paradigm, they have been frequently challenged. Id. at 1813. 57 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1)-(7) (1988). It is irrelevant whether the drugs are meant to be sold or are meant for personal use. See, e.g., United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that "the statutory language belies the argument that the forfeiture provisions are limited to commercial trafficking, and the uniform course ofjudicial decisions indicates that it is not the role of the courts to mitigate the harshness of these statutes").
58 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6). 59 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) authorizes forfeiture of "all monies, negotiable instruments, The government's interest in the forfeited property vests at the time of the illegal act; the forfeiture proceeding perfects this interest.
60 This is called the "relation back doctrine." 6 1 It allows the government to take all traceable proceeds, including derivative proceeds, such as interest, income, and dividends.
62
Property may be seized by the government through either an admiralty or a statutory route. 65 Once the government has seized the property, it must follow the forfeiture proceeding outlined in the customs laws 64 whereby the government may forfeit property through either a summary or a judicial procedure. 65 Owners may purchase back their property in a summary procedure or they may request a judicial proceeding. 6 6 To initiate ajudicial proceeding, they must file a claim establishing their ownership interest, and demonstrate standing. 6 7 Only then must the government prove that it had probable cause to seize the property.
68
Courts have defined the government's burden of probable cause loosely; 6 9 to establish a prima facie case, the government need only securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance... [and] all proceeds traceable to such an exchange 60 "All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 21 U.S.C. 881(h) (1988) . But see United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (weakening the relation back doctrine by holding that a government's title in property is not self-executing and does apply until the government perfects its title in the property by obtaining a forfeiture order).
61 In Buena Vista, Scalia describes the "relation back doctrine" as "a doctrine of retroactive vesting of title that takes effect only upon entry of the judicial order of forfeiture or condemnation." 113 S. Ct. at 1128. 
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introduce evidence that establishes a "reasonable ground for belief [that the property is narcotics proceeds], supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion." 70 Courts find probable cause under a "totality of the circumstances standard." 71 The rules of evidence are relaxed for this purpose. Often circumstantial evidence will show probable cause. 7 2 Hearsay evidence is also admissible, 7 3 and evidence acquired after the seizure of the property may also be used. 74 Additionally, the prosecutor does not need to introduce evidence establishing a direct connection between the seized property and the illegal activity. 7 5 Only after a claimant presents her evidence must the government produce "trial-quality" evidence.
76
After the government shows probable cause, the burden shifts to the claimant. 7 7 She must show that the property is not subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. 78 79 To reclaim her property she must prove that her property is not "guilty" by establishing one of the following: she had no knowledge of the drug violation and she did everything she reasonably could to prevent the violation from occurring; 8 0 the property was stolen or it is a common carrier; 8 ' or there is no traceable connection between the property and unlawful drug transactions. 8 2 Only "innocent" owners of real estate or conveyances are exempt from forfeiture if they can prove their lack of knowledge or consent.
8 3
Since these are affirmative defenses regarding knowledge, 8 4 the claimant faces a dilemma; if she fails to answer the pleading or comply with discovery, she may waive her right to testify at trial. 8 81 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (A)-(B), (a) (7) (providing exceptions for common carriers and stolen property).
82 Id. at § 881 (a) (6)-(7). The "innocent owner" provision is often interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1982). The court found that the owner was not an innocent owner within the scope of the provision because the owner had been negligent. Id. at 418. The owner took possession of the plane as collateral for a defaulted loan but left it in a hanger. Id. at 415-16. When the plane was used for a drug run, the owner could not prove that it was stolen. Id. The court found that the owner had not "done all that could reasonably be done" to protect against the illegal use. Id. at 418. But see United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the "innocent owner" defense depends on claimants' actual, not constructive, knowledge), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974) (stating in dicta that it may be unconstitutional to seize an "exceptionally innocent" owner's property).
83 An innocent owner is one who had not consented or had knowledge of the illegal use of her property. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C), (a) (6)-(7) (1988) . Note that some civil forfeiture statutes do not have innocent owner provisions. If such statutes are considered remedial, then an innocent owner is not protected from forfeiture of her property. See Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (Five to four decision with no majority opinion holding that an innocent owner was not protected from civil forfeiture under the Due Process or the Takings Clause).
84 It is constitutional to put the burden of an affirmative defense on a defendant. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) . Although the government is required to prove every element of the charged offense, it is not required to prove the absence of an affirmative defense. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795-96 (1952) .
85 If the owner files a claim, she will give the government her identity, which may lead to criminal charges. But if she does not file a claim, she has no standing to pursue her ownership interests, and the property will be lost to her by default. See United States v.
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does not answer, she cannot establish a defense to the forfeiture. 
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SHANNON T. NOYA developed during the sixteenth century as a resistance to heresy proceedings in the English ecclesiastical courts. 91 When heresy became more prevalent in England in the late fourteenth century, English ecclesiastic courts began to use the oath ex officio. 92 The oath ex officio came from the inquisitio proceedings that dominated the European continent. 93 In the European proceeding the judge played the role of accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury. 94 Before the proceeding, the suspect swore the oath ex officio, which required the suspect to tell the truth to all interrogatories. 9 5 The court compelled the witness to take this oath without knowing the charges, the accusers, or the evidence. 9 6 In these proceedings the defendant had the burden of proof; she had to establish her innocence. 9 7 Yet the oath provoked self-incrimination. 98 If the witness did not take the oath, under the pro confesso rule she was believed guilty. If she did take the oath, she risked being accused of perjury if she did not answer in the expected manner. 99 Initial opposition to the oath came primarily from the civil courts 93 LEvy, supra note 90, at 42. The inquisitio originated on the European continent during the end of the twelfth century as a method of discovering and punishing misconduct in the clergy and later, was adopted to eradicate heresy. Id. at 20-37.
94 Id. at 23. 95 The oath was originally known as the oath de veritate dicenda, but because it became associated with a proceeding in which "the judged served ex officio as indicator, assailant, and convictor," it was also called the oath ex officio. LEvY, supra note 90, at 23-24.
96 Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 92, at 6. 97 BERGER, supra note 92, at 38.
98 Refusal to take the oath ex officio sometimes resulted in an individual being held pro confesso (as though she confessed) and convicto (convicted for the crime charged). LEVY, supra note 90, at 32. However, generally the prisoner was punished only for contempt of court. Id. The silence of individuals who refused to respond to any questions after taking the oath was also taken as pro confesso. Id. at 55 (discussing the trial in 1392 ofJohn Ashton) and at 75 (discussing the conviction in 1549 of Edmund Bonner, Bishop of London).
99 LEw, supra note 90, at 23-24. After Henry VIII repudiated the Pope, Sir Thomas More was executed for his failure to take the Oath of Supremacy and the oath ex officio. Id. at 69. He reportedly said, "thei offred me an othe by which I shoulde be sworen to make true aunswere to suche thinges as shoulde be asked me on the Kinges behalfe, concerning the Kinges owne person ....
Whereto I aunswered that verily I never purposed to swere any nooke othe more while I lived." Id. at 70.
[Vol. 86
HOISTED BY THEIR OWN PETARD who felt that the ecclesiastical courts were infringing on theirjurisdiction. 1 00 The first recorded instance of someone objecting to the procedure and claiming an early form of the American Fifth Amendment occurred in 1532.101 Widespread resistance to the oath did not begin until 1554, when large numbers of Anglicans and Puritans were tried as heretics during the reign of Mary J. 102 Puritans refused to take the oath for many reasons. Some believed that the oath was barred by the Magna Charta's "law of the land" clause. 103 Some adopted the stance of the civil courts, arguing that the thirteen century common law prohibited ecclesiastical encroachment on civil court jurisdiction. 0 4 Others contested that the common law forbade forcing self-incrimination. 0 5 And still others refused to take the oath on moral grounds. 101 In 1532,John Lambert, who died at the stake, refused to answer by sworn statement one of the 45 articles charging him with Protestant convictions. LEw, supra note 90, at 3. He stated "though I did remember ... yet were I more than twice a fool to show you thereof; for it is written in your own law, 'No man is bound to bewray [accuse] himself.'" Id.
102 Mary I established the Court of High Commission which functioned as the ecclesiastical branch of the Privy Council and the Star Chamber. Law, supra note 90, at 76. She charged the Commission with inquiring into all heresies, including offenses against the church, offenses in the church, offenses against church property, failure to attend church, and all seditious words. Id. The letters creating the commission gave the commission discretionary power. Id. Extensive vocal opposition to the oath ex officio began in 1583 when Elizabeth I, following Mary's example, began using the High Commission to purge the country of heretics. BERGER, supra note 92, at 9-11. The High Commission had limited powers. It could imprison but it could not convict those that refused to take the oathonly the Star Chamber had the power to convict. Id. at 12. Opposition was usually futile. Id. Although Star Chamber proceedings had many common law protections, the oath could be administered in all but capital cases. 1 07 During Coke's tenure, he, as well as common lawjudges and members of Parliament, promoted the Latin maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere-no one is bound to accuse himself. 10 8 Their efforts met with some success. Their long campaign against the oath in England stimulated a growing belief that the oath was unjust because it violated human dignity and the human instinct for self-preservation by requiring defendants to accuse themselves. 10 9 Nonetheless, even at common law, the right against self-incrimination was limited." 0 Although defendants could not be forced to answer, the prosecutor and the judge could construe their silence adversely. 1 1 More importantly, the indictment was a prima facie case against the defendant-there was no authentic presumption of innocence. 1 12 One commentator argues that if the defendant claimed his right to silence, "he could rely on a verdict of guilty," meaning that "accused persons, whether in ecclesiastical or common-law courts still had no meaningful right against compulsory self-incrimination." 1 3
In 1662, enacted legislation forbade the use of the oath in any proceeding on the grounds that compelled self-accusation was unfair.' 14 Simultaneously, criminal procedures adopted civil rules that barred a party in interest from testifying; 1 5 interested parties were deemed untrustworthy." 6 Compulsory interrogation became pointless since an accused could not testify for or against herself." 7 Although the right against self-incrimination is part of America's common law inheritance from England, its transition into America 
114
The trial ofJohn Lilburne in 1637 for sending seditious books from Holland to England was the catalyst that led to the eventual ban of the oath ex officio. LEw, supra note 90, at 271-72. Lilburne refused to take the oath, stating "I understand, that this Oath is one and the same with the High Commission Oath, which Oath I know to be both against the law of God and the law of the land; and therefore in brief I dare not take the oath, though I suffer death for the refusal of it." BERGER, supra note 92, at 17. 115 BERGER, supra note 92, at 21. 116 Id. 117 Id.
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was not smooth. 118 Some American colonies had been established before the right became fixed in English common law. 1 19 Neither the Star Chamber nor the High Commission courts-courts which regularily compelled self-incrimination-were imported into America; this deprived the American colonies of a symbol around which to coalesce a movement against self-incrimination. 120 Consequently, American colonies did not respect the right against self-incrimination with any consistency.
121
Congressman James Madison framed the first American version of the right against self-incrimination. 122 This version would have given the right to parties in both civil and criminal proceedings. 23 However, the House of Representatives amended it so that today it applies only to criminal matters. 119 Lv, supra note 90, at 333. 120 BERGER, supra note 92, at 21. 121 Id. The oath ev officio was adopted in some colonies as a means of suppressing divergent religions. See Tarello, supra note 100, at 141. The first mention of the right against self-incrimination occurs in 1637 in Virginia where ReverendJohn Wheelwright was prosecuted for his Antinomian beliefs. L&, supra note 90, at 340-41. When he was told that the interrogation would be conducted ex officio, he objected. Id. at 341. However, he objected because of the association of the term ex officio with the High Commission. Id. at 341-42. Wheelright did not try to claim a substantial right against self-incrimination. Id. at 343. After the court assured him that their purpose was not to elicit "involuntary" admissions from him, he responded freely to almost all of their questions. I.
122 The first "self-incrimination" clause appeared in the Virginia Bill of Rights. BERGER, supra note 92, at 22. 123 Id. at 23. 124 Id. The privilege has never been interpreted narrowly. See BERGER, supra note 92, at 50. Moreover, if the amendment had been interpreted literally, it would be hard to see any justification for it because at the time it was adopted, mostjurisdictions prevented defendants from testifying in their own trials. Id.
125 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988 
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SHANNON T. NOYA answering will self-incriminate. 28 The policies behind the Fifth Amendment are not as clear. Once, the Fifth Amendment was believed to safeguard the truth. 29 This rationale stemmed from a belief that if a court compelled a defendant to answer, she might be tempted to perjure herself.180 Another factor behind the amendment was the worry that if the defendant did answer, the jury might give her answers, which would be self-interested, undue weight.
1
However, in Tehan v. United States ex re. Short, 132 the Court found that "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," nor was its basic purpose to protect the innocent. 13 3 Since Tehan, the Court has characterized the Fifth Amendment as a "private enclave" whereby a citizen may "create a zone of privacy which the government may not force him to surrender to his detriment." 134 Today, the Fifth Amendment is believed to function as a shield against the government's sword. 135 Through her right to silence, the individual can better establish a balance of power between herself and the state.'
V. THE IMPACT OF FORFEITURE ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A. FORFEITURE AS A QUASI-CRIMINAL ACTION
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the Fifth Amendment dilemma in forfeiture proceedings was Boyd v. United States. 137 In Boyd, the government seized thirty-five cases of plate glass for violations of the customs revenue laws. 13 8 During the trial the claimants were ordered to produce an invoice of twenty-nine cases of glass previously imported into the United States.' 3 9 Although the claimants objected, arguing that compelling production of evidence from claimants in a forfeiture case to incriminate them was unconstitutional, they produced the invoice.' 40 The jury found for the United States; the thirtyfive plates of glass were forfeited.' 4 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 42 The Court reasoned that the customs statute compelled the production of the documents.' 43 If the claimants failed to produce them, the claimants would be considered guilty.' 4 4 In other words, their silence would be construed as a confession. 145 Moreover, the actions that resulted in the forfeiture could have resulted in criminal charges.
146
There was a strong possibility that if the claimant or owner testified, she would incriminate herself. 147 The Boyd Court found that forfeiture actions are "in their nature criminal,"' 48 or quasi-criminal; 14 9
138 Id. at 617. The customs law violated was 18 Stat. 186 (1874). It stated:
[A]ny owner, importer, consignee, & c., who shall, with intent to defraud the revenue, make or attempt to make, any entry of imported merchandise, by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter or paper, or by means of any false statement written or verbal, or who shall be guilty of an wilful act or omission, by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, shall for each offence be fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both; and, in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited. Id. 143 Id. at 621-22. 144 Id. 145 Historically, the statute was like the oath ex officio since it allowed an allegation to be taken as confessed if the claimant or defendant did not produce the required papers. The statute stated that "the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed, unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction of the court." Id. at 620. The Boyd opinion focused on an individual's right to feel secure in both his person and property. 52 Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley traced the similarities between the abuse of early American civil rights and the infringement upon Boyd's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 153 The Boyd Court recognized that individuals must be shielded from arbitrary power with full constitutional protection.' 5 4 Toward that end, the Boyd Court recommended that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed." 5 6 when it held that gamblers could raise the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil action for failure to file statutorily required forms. 157 The Court found that there was a "substantial" risk that the forms would incriminate the gamblers.
15 8 The gambling statute contained an innocent owner provision allowing individuals to petition for the return of their property. Through this provision, the Court inferred a scienter of negligence.' 5 9 Since guilt or innocence was an element of the forfeiture action, 160 the Court found that the forfeiture statute, when viewed in its entirety, was intended to penalize only those "significantly" involved in a criminal enterprise. 161 For problematic. See Schecter, supra note 3, at 1159-60. Schecter notes that there is no hierarchy of the constitutional rights granted a criminal defendant; when courts grant or withhold constitutional rights to forfeiture claimants, they do so at their discretion. 155 The rest of the quote reads "[a] close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. at 635. 156 401 U.S. 715 (1971) . 157 Id. at 721-22. 158 Id. at 717-18. '59 Id. at 719-21. 160 Id. at 721-22. 161 Id.
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Fifth Amendment purposes the action was a criminal proceeding 62 and, therefore, the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional. 163 The innocent owner provision within 21 U.S.C. § 881 would seem to indicate that claimants should receive the same protections awarded to the Coin and Currency claimants. Although the gambling statute at issue in Coin and Currency contained a self-reporting requirement, and § 881 does not, § 881 does require that an owner affirmatively prove her innocence to obtain her property. 6 4 If under § 881165 an owner can establish that she was completely "innocent" of any knowledge or negligence with regard to the illegal use of her property, her property will not be forfeited. 166 Thus, guilt or innocence is a significant element with regard to an owner's ability to retain her property.
Proving one's innocence requires reporting on one's activities.
167
To prove innocence an individual must establish that she acquired the property in another way or that she had no knowledge of its unlawful use.lea An individual's activities may not always be innocent or lawful' 69 For example, the property may not be the proceeds of illegal narcotics activity but may be the proceeds of some other illegal activity. 17 0 Requiring a claimant to report on the origin of her property or her lack of knowledge requires her to self-report. 171 Thus, it appears as though the rationale underlying the holding that, for Fifth Amendment purposes, the Coin and Currency statute initiated a criminal proceeding would also indicate that, for Fifth Amendment purposes, the forfeiture proceedings in the Drug Abuse and Prevention Act are also criminal. 
516
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of all of the evidence, 20 7 and there had to be a showing of "substantial evidence." 20 8 The Court emphasized that it is constitutional to take an individual's property based on presented evidence, but it is unconstitutional to take an individual's property simply because he will not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. 2 0 9 The Baxter Court found additional support for its holding in the important state interests that state prison disciplinary hearings serve.
10
Since an owner bears the burden of proof in establishing an affirmative defense, United States v. Rylandea2" must be read in conjunction with Baxter. In Rylander, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that a corporation's president was in contempt for failing to produce corporate documents subpoenaed by the IRS. 212 The Court noted that Rylander's only defense to the contempt charge was that he did not have the documents. 2 13 For this defense, Rylander had the burden of production. 2 14 Rylander's invocation of the Fifth Amendment during cross examination prevented him from satisfying his burden. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehnquist said that the Fifth Amendment has "never been thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would assist in meeting the burden of production." 2 16
To allow the Fifth Amendment to be used in this way "would convert the privilege from the shield against compulsory self-incrimination... to a sword ....
1 7
Together, Baxter and Rylander have been cited for the proposition that adverse inferences are permissible when a claimant takes the 207 The Court commented:
[T]his case is very different from the circumstances before the Court in the GarrikyLeflowitz decisions, where refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive a Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, resulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with the State. There, failure to respond to interrogations was treated as a final admission of guilt. Here Palmigiano remained silent at the hearing in the face of evidence that incriminated him; and, as far as this record reveals, his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts surrounding the case. Id. at 317-18. 208 Id. at 317. 209 The Court found that a prison disciplinary proceeding was not a criminal procedure. I& at 317. Therefore, it declined to extend the Griffin ruling barring adverse inferences in criminal cases. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted these holdings to mean that a negative inference may be drawn in a civil forfeiture action when a claimant takes the Fifth Amendment, as long as the court's final judgment is not based solely on the negative inference. 22 1 Although the Second Circuit has not committed itself on this issue, it has speculated that negative inferences may be impermissible within the forfeiture context "given the severity of the deprivation at risk." 22 2 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that a negative inference may not be drawn in a civil forfeiture proceeding if the inference could "harm" the claimant in a parallel criminal action.
23
The Sixth Circuit found that since the forfeiture provisions appear within the criminal code, and since they are intended to impose a penalty only on those "significantly involved in a criminal enterprise," claimants have the same safeguards as criminal defendantsincluding the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to remain silent-without automatically suffering forfeiture of their property. Arguably, the Second and the Eleventh Circuits misread Baxter and Rylander. Two important factors are missing in narcotics civil forfeiture proceedings that were present in Baxter 1) the Court found the state had an "important state interest" in maintaining discipline within its prison system; 225 and 2) the Court found the adverse infer- Prison official decisions are judged by a less restrictive test than that applied to laws and regulations outside prison walls. 228 Moreover, the state's burden of proof, substantial evidence, is interpreted in light of the state's need to maintain order within the prison system. 229 Finally, the states' burden of proof in a prison disciplinary hearing, substantial evidence, may be considerably higher than the government's burden of proof in civil forfeiture, which, if unrebutted, may be met by probable cause. Therefore, the Baxter test is arguably more lenient than the test that should be applied to the rights of claimant's under 21 U.S.C. § 881.
Rylander is also distinguishable from civil forfeiture. In Rylander, the defendant was charged with civil contempt. 23 0 Civil contempt is imposed for violating court orders. An individual may purge himself of that contempt by complying with the court order. 23 1 In contrast, in civil forfeiture proceedings what is at stake is ownership of propertyonce it is lost, the owner will not regain it. 231 Civil contempt sanctions are avoidable through obedience. The court may imposed them after a civil proceeding, which requires neither ajury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See International Union United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (1994) (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt). However, criminal contempt may only be applied after a trial that includes full constitutional protections.
232 However, it is often difficult to distinguish between criminal and civil contempt sanctions. The difficulty of distinguishing between the two of them, the "confusing mess of the law," as well as the potential perception that the sanctions are arbitrary, has fueled criticism from many commentators. 
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More importantly, as the Supreme Court held in Lefkowitz, citizens cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves to serve governmental needs. 233 Claimants technically retain their constitutional right in their property until they are shown to have used their property in such a way as to break the law. 234 By permitting an adverse inference against the claimant, the Eleventh Circuit arguably circumvented a claimant's rights so the government could meet its goal of undermining the economic base of narcotics traffickers. 
HOISTED BY THETR OWN PETARD
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy indicated the important property rights that forfeiture provisions implicate: "Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this and many other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within it."242 Depriving Good of his property, even if only for a short time, deprived him of the "valuable rights of ownership." 243 The Court noted that the claimant's criminal conviction was irrelevant because "fair procedures are not confined to the innocent. 244 Reaffirming its earlier holdings, the Court stated that the applicability of one constitutional right does not pre-empt the applicability of another. 2 5 The Court concluded that adversary hearings will ensure the neutrality that should be characteristic of all governmental decisionmaking, 24 6 and courts must scrutinize governmental actions more carefully whenever the State may benefit. 247 Otherwise, ex parte seizure will create a danger that the individual and society will perceive governmental action as arbitrary and unfair.
48
James Daniel Good affirms the importance of an individual's property rights. It reiterates the Boyd Court's concern with arbitrary government action. 2 49 The holding arguably makes it more difficult for the government to forfeit property through summary judgment. If the government cannot rely on a claimant's conviction as part of its case for summary judgment, and the court must carefully examine state action whenever it is in a position to benefit, the state arguably must make a stronger showing than that which is currently statutorily demanded to justify summary judgment. )) (arguing that the purpose of prior notice and a hearing is to "ensure abstract fair play to the individual" and to "protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair of mistaken deprivations of property.... ."). The Court noted that the seizure in this case was different from the usual governmental search and seizure because the Government seized property in order to assert ownership and control over it, not to preserve evidence for future proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that governments historically have perceived forfeiture as a punishment. 2 5 4 Reserving the question as to whether it violates due process to forfeit the possessions of a truly innocent owner, the Court pointed out that the innocent owner defense in the forfeiture statute implies some measure of guilt in an owner. 2 55 Additionally, the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) indicate that Congress intended the statute to be punitive.
2 5 6 Since the statute and the legislative history focus on the culpability of the owner, the Court concluded that forfeiture under § 881 serves as "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense."
257
The acknowledgement in Austin that forfeiture is punishment closed the gap even further between forfeiture as a civil action and forfeiture as a criminal sanction. 2 58 Since the Austin Court found that the guilt or innocence of an owner is now at issue in an action under § 881, there is no longer any substance to the "guilty" property fiction within this statute. 2 59 The excuse that Fifth Amendment rights are not pertinent no longer applies. Courts must recognize that since the guilt of a claimant is at issue, the Fifth Amendment right must not be burdened. Courts have attempted to protect claimants from the harsh effects of their testimony in civil forfeiture through stays, use immunity, and protective orders. 2 60 However, these solutions have not resolved the problem. For the most part, these remedies have been unable to fully protect the claimant against the possible adverse affects of her testimony in the civil proceeding.
Stay
If the government has initiated criminal proceedings, it has a statutory right to ask for a stay in the civil proceedings; the court may grant one for "good cause shown." 26 ' However, a claimant will have trouble obtaining a stay if she has not established adequate standing; 262 sometimes proving standing alone can implicate a claimant in a crime. Moreover, a stay does not resolve the problem if the government has not filed criminal proceedings. 2 63 Since the government may not have decided whether to pursue criminal charges, it is difficult for a civil court to determine the necessary length of time to stay the proceedings. 2 64 Finally, a stay will not be granted if a claimant merely invokes her privilege against self-incrimination-she has to af-260 United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district court had discretionary power to determine how to accommodate a Fifth Amendment interest). 261 The relevant provision reads:
The filing of an indictment of information alleging a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, or a violation of State or local law that could have been charged under this subchapter or subchapter II, which is also related to a civil forfeiture proceeding under this section shall, upon motion of the United States and for good cause shown, stay the civil forfeiture proceeding. 21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (1989) .
See also U.S. v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that courts may defer civil discovery when in the interest of justice); United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding the district court's denial of a stay pending an appeal of his criminal conviction). In Little Al the court stated that stays are granted only for "special circumstances" and the need to avoid "substantial and irreparable prejudice." Id. 1143 (1982) ).
263 United States v. Premises Located at Highway 13/5 Phil Cambell, 747 F. Supp. 641, 651 (finding that the stay requested by the governmentwas unreasonable since two of the claimants were "apparently" not going to be prosecuted).
264 In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the government for seizing property and then attempting to put "on hold" the civil forfeiture proceeding pending the outcome of the civil case although the government had not demonstrated that "no substantial harm" would be suffered by the claimant).
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